Every Australian emergency plan assumes that Triple Zero (000) is available when the call is made. Every warden training program teaches Triple Zero as the primary notification channel. Every Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) procedure defaults to “call 000” as the first external action. This assumption held for decades, and it is still correct for the overwhelming majority of incidents.

The 18 September 2025 Optus outage and the November 2025 TPG failure demonstrated that the assumption is not always correct. The Optus outage, caused by a firewall upgrade during a network change, left callers across South Australia, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and far west New South Wales unable to reach Triple Zero for almost 14 hours. Around 600 calls failed and four deaths were linked to the outage. The November 2025 TPG failure was different in nature but no less serious: certain older handsets could not connect to Triple Zero on the Vodafone network when other networks were unavailable, a device-compatibility fault that has been linked to at least one death. Neither event affected every carrier or every device at once, but for any organisation whose emergency notification depended on an affected network or handset, the impact was direct and immediate.

This guide covers what the 2025 outages exposed, what Australian workplaces should now include in their emergency plans, and how to design a Triple Zero fallback procedure that works when the primary channel does not.

What the 2025 outages exposed

The technical detail of the outages is well-documented in the ACMA (Australian Communications and Media Authority) and industry post-incident reports. The operational lesson for workplace emergency planning is more important than the technical detail:

• Triple Zero is delivered through the commercial telecommunications carriers. It is not an independent, always-available government service.
• When a carrier fails, its customers cannot reach Triple Zero via that carrier. The fallback is other carriers, other channels, or a delayed response.
• Modern workplaces are often single-carrier by default. A building or organisation that has consolidated to one telecommunications provider has consolidated its emergency notification capability to that provider.
• The failure mode is unpredictable. The 2025 outages affected different network segments in different ways. Some services worked, others did not. Some geographies were affected, others were not.
• Occupants and staff often did not know the outage was happening. Their phones showed reception. Calls appeared to connect. Only the failure to complete the call to Triple Zero revealed the issue.

The core lesson: Triple Zero is highly reliable but is not infallible. A compliant emergency plan should include a fallback procedure for the rare case where it is unavailable.

The regulatory context

The 2025 outages prompted regulatory scrutiny and expectations of change. The ACMA reviewed carrier obligations. Industry codes were updated. Government and industry have committed to further work on carrier resilience and cross-carrier failover.

From an emergency planning perspective, the practical position for 2026 and beyond is:

• Triple Zero remains the primary notification channel for every Australian workplace emergency.
• AS 3745:2010 Section 4 expects the emergency plan to include communication arrangements. A robust plan now interprets that requirement to include a fallback for the primary channel.
• The 2025 model WHS amendments and NSW WHS Regulation 2025 raised the bar for foreseeable-risk planning. A telecommunications outage is now demonstrably foreseeable.
• Facilities that have documented and exercised a Triple Zero fallback procedure demonstrate a higher standard of care in the event of a future outage-affected incident.

What a Triple Zero fallback procedure covers

A fallback procedure is not a replacement for Triple Zero. It is a documented set of alternative actions the ECO takes when Triple Zero is unavailable or delayed. At minimum, the fallback procedure covers:

1. Alternative call paths

Different carriers. If the primary handset uses one carrier, identify a secondary phone (mobile, landline, or specific building-provided line) on a different carrier. If the primary carrier is unavailable, attempt the call via the alternative.

Landlines. Traditional copper landlines (where still installed) route differently from mobile networks and have historically been less affected by mobile outages. In buildings that retain landline capability, note the landline as a fallback path.

Building alarm systems. Many commercial buildings have monitored fire alarm systems that connect directly to a monitoring centre and dispatch emergency services. In an outage, the alarm system may still function if the monitoring path uses different infrastructure.

2. Direct contact numbers for local emergency services

In addition to Triple Zero, many local Fire and Rescue stations, police stations and ambulance stations have direct numbers that can be called if Triple Zero is unavailable. These should be documented in the emergency plan and updated periodically. The Chief Warden and Communications Officer should have them accessible without needing to look them up.

3. In-person notification

For serious incidents in facilities that are physically close to emergency services, in-person notification is a valid fallback. Sending a runner to the nearest fire station, police station or ambulance station is slower than a phone call but faster than waiting for a delayed Triple Zero to come back online.

4. Building-to-building coordination

In precincts, business parks, or multi-tenanted developments, adjacent buildings may have functioning telecommunications when yours does not. A coordinated agreement with neighbouring building management to notify emergency services on each other’s behalf is a low-cost fallback that requires only a phone call to arrange.

5. Communication with occupants during the outage

An outage that affects Triple Zero often also affects internal communications. The fallback procedure covers how occupants are alerted (public address, warden radio, direct verbal communication) when SMS and app-based cascades are not available.

Designing the fallback for your facility

The specific fallback procedure depends on the facility. Below is a step-by-step approach that scales across small offices, high-rise buildings, and multi-tenanted developments:

Step 1: Identify your primary telecommunications carrier for both mobile and fixed-line services.

Step 2: Identify a diverse secondary carrier used by at least one authorised staff member (or provided by the organisation as a dedicated backup handset). “Diverse” means a genuinely different network, not a reseller of the same network.

Step 3: Document the direct contact numbers for your local Fire and Rescue station, police station, and ambulance station. Confirm they are the correct current numbers by calling the general line (during business hours) and asking.

Step 4: If your building has a monitored alarm system, confirm with the monitoring provider what happens if their primary telecommunications path fails. Many use diverse-carrier or radio-based backups.

Step 5: If your facility is close to emergency services (within 500 metres), document the in-person notification route and identify a designated runner role in the ECO.

Step 6: For multi-tenanted or precinct facilities, coordinate with adjacent buildings on mutual notification arrangements.

Step 7: Update the Emergency Management Manual with the fallback procedure and the Chief Warden decision framework for invoking it.

Step 8: Brief the ECO and communicate the fallback procedure to all wardens.

Step 9: Include a Triple Zero fallback scenario in the next evacuation exercise cycle.

When to invoke the fallback

The Chief Warden or Communications Officer invokes the fallback when the primary Triple Zero call has failed. The failure signals are:

• The call does not connect (no dial tone, no ringback)
• The call connects but does not complete (silent, dropped, message played)
• The call reaches an “all lines busy” or “not available” recording
• Public information indicates an active outage affecting the carrier

Do not delay the fallback while re-attempting Triple Zero repeatedly. If the primary attempt fails, move to the fallback path immediately. If Triple Zero becomes available while the fallback is underway, use both.

For incidents where the risk to life is imminent (active fire, active threat, medical arrest), the Chief Warden should invoke the fallback within 60 to 90 seconds of the primary failure. For less time-critical incidents, additional attempts on the primary channel are appropriate before invoking the fallback.

Testing the fallback

A fallback procedure that has never been tested is not a fallback procedure. Include a Triple Zero fallback scenario in the multi-year evacuation exercise cycle. See our guide on designing multi-year evacuation exercise scenarios for how this fits into a broader exercise program.

The fallback exercise should not involve an actual call to Triple Zero (which would waste emergency service resources). It involves:

• The Chief Warden or Communications Officer simulating a Triple Zero attempt that fails
• The ECO working through the documented fallback path
• Verifying that the alternative carrier handset is accessible and charged
• Verifying that the direct emergency service numbers are current
• Verifying that the runner route (where applicable) is walkable and unobstructed
• Debriefing the exercise as with any other exercise

Multi-tenanted buildings and shared facilities

In multi-tenanted buildings, the Triple Zero fallback is often best coordinated at the building level rather than the tenant level. The building master plan should include the fallback procedure and coordinate with tenant sub-plans. Coordination gaps are the most common compliance issue in multi-tenanted facilities, and communications fallback is one of the most consequential gaps to leave unresolved. See our guide on emergency planning for multi-tenanted buildings for the broader coordination framework.

Common fallback design mistakes

From our work with Australian facilities since the 2025 outages, we see recurring mistakes in fallback design:

• Both the primary and the “fallback” handset are on the same carrier. Not a fallback.
• The fallback path is documented but no physical device is provisioned. In the outage, no one knows where the secondary handset is or how to access it.
• The direct emergency service numbers are years out of date. Some stations have been consolidated or closed. Test the numbers.
• The Chief Warden was not briefed on the fallback and defaults to re-dialling Triple Zero repeatedly.
• The fallback assumes the internal public address system will work. In some outages, integrated systems have shared infrastructure that fails together.
• No exercise has ever tested the fallback. The first time it is needed is the first time it is used.
• The multi-tenanted building has no cross-tenant coordination. Each tenant has their own fallback, none of them aware of the others.

Get your facility ready

Triple Zero fallback planning is a small addition to a comprehensive emergency plan that pays off disproportionately in a rare but consequential scenario. With more than 40 years behind our AS 3745-compliant emergency planning work, First 5 Minutes helps Australian facilities close gaps like this one before they matter. Explore our facility emergency evacuation plan service, our AS 3745 compliance essentials, and our audits and inspections service, or contact our team on 1300 321 120 to discuss telecommunications resilience for your emergency plan.

Frequently asked questions

Is Triple Zero reliable in Australia?

Triple Zero is highly reliable. Outages are rare. However, the 2025 Optus and TPG failures showed that Triple Zero access can be lost either through a carrier network fault or through a device-compatibility issue affecting particular handsets. A robust emergency plan now includes a fallback for the rare case where the primary channel is unavailable.

Does AS 3745 require a Triple Zero fallback?

AS 3745:2010 requires communication arrangements in the emergency plan. It does not explicitly prescribe a Triple Zero fallback. Post-2025, a robust interpretation of the standard, and any auditor or insurer, would expect a fallback procedure to be documented in a compliant plan.

What if my building has a monitored fire alarm?

A monitored fire alarm system that dispatches emergency services automatically can be an effective fallback. Confirm with the monitoring provider what happens if their primary telecommunications path fails. Many use diverse or radio-based backup paths.

Do we need a dedicated backup mobile on a different carrier?

For most facilities, yes. If the primary carrier is unavailable, the backup handset needs to be on a genuinely different network. Verify that the “different network” is not simply a reseller of the same primary network.

Should we call the local police station directly?

For non-immediate matters and as a Triple Zero fallback, yes. Document the direct number in your emergency plan. For most immediate emergencies where Triple Zero is available, Triple Zero remains the correct first call because it coordinates the multi-service response.

What about in-person notification?

Valid as a fallback for facilities within short walking distance of an emergency service station. Slower than a phone call but faster than waiting for a delayed Triple Zero to come back online. Include a designated runner role in the ECO for this fallback path.

How often should the fallback be tested?

At least annually, as part of the multi-year evacuation exercise cycle. More frequently if the facility has changed carriers, changed key personnel, or changed emergency service coverage.

What if we are in a rural area with limited coverage?

Rural facilities have historically had more experience with telecommunications gaps than urban ones. The same fallback framework applies, with more emphasis on satellite communications, high-frequency radio (where appropriate), and coordination with nearby facilities. Rural facilities in bushfire-prone areas should coordinate with the relevant state fire service (CFA, RFS, QFES, CFS, DFES, TFS) on communication resilience.

Should we brief occupants on the fallback?

Only in general terms. Occupants need to know the ECO has a fallback if primary communications fail; they do not need to know the operational detail. The Chief Warden, Deputy Chief Warden, and Communications Officer need to know the full procedure.

What if the outage is regional and no carrier is working?

Rare but not impossible in a natural disaster or major infrastructure failure. In this scenario, in-person notification and shelter-in-place become the primary responses. Local emergency services will typically deploy proactively in a widespread outage. The fallback plan should acknowledge this as the worst-case scenario and default to sheltering occupants safely while waiting for service response.